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I Introduction
The economic analysis of law in the United States began with the use of price theory to
explain economic phenomena in antitrust cases.1 The invasion was not altogether
welcome.2 Naturally any attempt to superimpose one discipline upon another was likely to
result in conflicts and tensions. Notwithstanding these beginnings, antitrust law and
economics is now held out in the United States as the model "law and" subject from an
academic point of view.3 The judiciary in the United States likewise recognises the vital
role that economics plays in antitrust cases. Justice (then Judge) Breyer, for example, has
suggested that economics plays two important roles in the antitrust controversy: it
influences the content of the rules of law and impacts upon the proof of specific economic
facts.4
However, notwithstanding this accepted utility of economics in the field of antitrust,
there remains a certain unease between the disciplines. This tension is not limited to
economics and antitrust law. Rather, there are inherent difficulties involved in imposing
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Otago.
1 For historical accounts of this development see R A Posner Economic Analysis of Law (4 ed, Little
Brown & Co, Boston, 1992) ch 2; R H Bork The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War With Itself (The
Free Press, New York, 1993) xii.
2 See GJ Stigler "Law or Economics?" (1992) 35 JL& Econ 455.
3 See eg R W Gordon "Lawyers, Scholars, and the 'Middle Ground"' (1993) 91 Mich L Rev 2075,
2084.
4 S J Breyer "Economics and Judging: An Afterword on Cooter and Wald" (1987) 50 Law and
Contemp Probs 245,248.
-- 911,
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economics on law. This has been acknowledged by some leading economists. For example,
Professor George Stigler has recently suggested that:5
The difference between a discipline that seeks to explain economic life (and, indeed, all
rational behaviour) and a discipline that seeks to achieve justice in regulating all aspects of
human behaviour is profound. This difference means that, basically, the economist and the
lawyer live in different worlds and speak different languages.
Apart from this fundamental difference between the disciplines, economists have also
warned about their own theoretical divisions and the reliance that others should place on
their scholarship.6
These origins and themes are relevant to New Zealand. Clearly, economics has the
potential to impact on the interpretation of competition laws in a significant way.
Industrial organisation economics is, after all, the study of private commercial markets,
which is the very subject matter of competition law. However, the merger of the disciplines
does not occur naturally. The inability to speak a common language, or the advancement of
economic theories which involve controversy, are clearly factors which have the potential
to limit significantly or to negate the application of the economic learning.
While there have been various legislative attempts to regulate competition in New
Zealand since 1908,7 it was not until the passing of the Commerce Act in 1986 that a
coherent legislative regime emerged. This legislation drew substantially upon influences
from foreign jurisdictions with appropriate modifications.8 This approach to the
formulation of the legislation was hardly surprising. Common analytical threads, based
upon United States antitrust influences, have appeared in the various new competition laws
of recent decades.
The economic focus of the Commerce Act is unique in New Zealand, both in terms of its
theoretical foundations and its institutional framework. As the first decade of this
legislation comes to a close, it is informative to reflect on these features of the Act and the
5 Stigler, above n 2,463.
6 See egOE Williamson "Intellectual Foundations: The Need For A Broader View" (1983) 33 J Leg
Ed 210, 212.
7 For a discussion of the historical development of New Zealand competition law, see H M
Donaldson "The Development of New Zealand Competition Law" in R J Ahdar (ed) Competition
Law and Policy in New Zealand (The Law Book Company Limited, Sydney, 1991) ch 2.
8 The Commerce Act 1986 is based upon the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). For a discussion of
the influence of foreign jurisdictions on the Australian legislation, see M Brunt "The Use of
Economic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation: Australia" (1986) 14 ABLR 261, 265.
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impact that economics has had on the decision-making process.9 This paper will briefly
review the New Zealand landscape, in terms of the goals of the Commerce Act, its
institutional framework, and the manner in which the strict rules of evidence may be
relaxed. It will then proceed to consider, by using Justice Breyer's framework, how
economics has impacted upon:
(1) the content of rules of law; and
(2) the proof of specific economic facts.
Finally, this paper will conclude with a brief assessment of likely and desirable future
trends in New Zealand law.
II The Landscape
A preliminary question concerning the impact that economics should have on
competition law in New Zealand relates to the goals of the Commerce Act. While a detailed
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, some general observations reflect
the economic aims of this legislation.
For the most part, the parliamentary debates leading up to the enactment of the Commerce
Act lacked a coherent focus on the question of goals.10 The virtue of competition was a
prevailing theme, as if this was the ultimate goal of the legislation. However, there was also
some recognition of the linkage of the competitive process to the goal of economic
efficiency,11 a matter which has been reinforced by the courts in a manner perhaps beyond
9 From the outset, it has been standard practice in New Zealand to engage economists in
Commerce Act litigation, and such trend has had a significant impact on the decision-making
process. In particular, extensive use has been made of leading United States economists. For
example, the following United States economists have appeared as expert witnesses in the High
Court: Professor David J Teece in Commerce Commission v Fletcher Challenge Limited [1989] 2 NZLR
554; Professor Benjamin Klein in Fisher & Paykel Limited v Commerce Commission [1990] 2 NZLR 731;
Professors William Baumol and Robert Willig and Dr Alfred Kahn in Clear Communications Limited v
Telecom Orporation of NZ Limited (1992) 5 TCLR 168.
10 Indeed, at the conclusion of the debate into the Second Reading of the Commerce Bill, the then
Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer stated: "... the debate we have listened to, and to which Iam replying,
was a debate of no quality. It was full of arguments that were spurious and misleading, and that
cannot be sustained on any factual basis; it was an exercise in parliamentary time wasting." See
NZPD, Vol 470, 930, 10 April 1986 (Palmer).
11 For instance, when moving the introduction of the Commerce Bill at its Second Reading, the Hon
David Caygill stated: "It [the Bill] will promote competition in the New Zealand marketplace. In
tandem with other changes [the reduction in the regulation of the economy], the Bill increases
efficiency in the New Zealand economy." See NZPD, Vol 469, 506, 18 March 1986 (Caygill).
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the intended scope of the Act's long title.12 Whether competition or economic efficiency is
the goal, the important point is that these prevailing themes are economic.13
The institutional framework of the Act also provides another signal that economic
analysis is, or at least should be, appropriate. The Commerce Commission, a body which
has a general enforcement role and which processes clearance and authorisation
applications for restrictive trade practices and business acquisitions, comprises economist
members and other members who are experienced in the business world.14 An unusual
feature of the Commerce Act, however, is that lay members (notably economists) can be
appointed to sit with the judge in High Court proceedings. In the case of appeals to the
Administrative Division of the High Court the judge must sit with at least one lay member.15
Accordingly, it is not surprising that some decisions of the Commerce Commission and the
High Court have contained detailed economic analysis and on occasions have spoken the
language of economics.16
12 In Tru Tone Limited v Festival Records Retail Marketing Limited [1988] 2 NZLR 352, Richardson J
concluded (at 358): "In terms of the long title the Commerce Act is an Act to promote
competition in markets in New Zealand. It is based on the premise that society's resources are
best allocated in a competitive market where rivalry between firms ensures maximum efficiency
in the use of resources." This statement has been adopted in Fisher & Paykel, above n 9, 756;
Telecom Corporation of NZ Limited v Commerce Commission [1992] 3 NZLR 429, 441. While
McGechan J and R G Blunt in Union Shipping NZ Limited v Port Nelson Limited [1990] 2 NZLR 662
purported to adopt this statement, the judgment arguably contains an internal inconsistency
because they go on to say (at 699): "It is the permission of competition which the Court is
directed to foster. Parliament, as a matter of policy, has decided benefits will flow from that
course. Whether such is a correct economic or social analysis is not a matter for the Court."
13 In contrast, the goals of antitrust in the United States lack such clarity. Various schools of
thought have emerged in the United States about the goals of antitrust, some of which are non-
economic. The debate has centred upon what Congress meant by the term "consumer welfare"
back in the 1890s. For a summary of the various schools of thought, see S F Ross principles of
Antitrust Law (The Foundation Press Inc, New York, 1993) ch 1. It has also been suggested that
the goals of the Australian legislation lack some certainty in terms of their efficiency orientation.
See T Pinos "Is There Law After Economics: Some Issues of Integration" (1985) 11 Mon LR 201,
203-07.
14 Section 9 of the Commerce Act 1986.
15 This requirement is not mandatory in the case of enforcement proceedings. The provisions
which govern the appointment of lay members are ss 77 and 78 of the Commerce Act 1986.
16 For a recent example of a Commerce Commission decision which reflects the influence of
economist members, see Weddel New Zealand Limited, Commerce Commission Decision 273,2
February 1995. The economist lay member of the High Court who has proven to be highly
influential in the development and application of economic analysis in the first decade of the
Commerce Act is Professor Maureen Brunt. See eg Telecom Corporation of NZ Limited v Commerce
Commission (1991) 3 NZBLC para 99-239; Clear u Telecom, above n 9.
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In contrast, there is no provision for the appointment of lay members to the Court of
Appeal and the Privy Council. While the Privy Council has been receptive to economic
analysis of the Commerce Act,17 the response of the Court of Appeal has been mixed.
Although the Court of Appeal has accepted that weight should attach to findings of the High
Court where lay members have assisted in the assessment of economic arguments,18 it has
also rejected the economic analysis of certain fundamental concepts,19 and has spoken of
"the uneasy relationship between economics and law [which] is likely to improve as
lawyers and economists become more familiar with each other's discipline and the
interrelationships of the two fields".20 More will be said about these trends later.
Some relaxation of strict evidentiary rules also accompanies the institutional
framework set up under the Commerce Act. Problems regarding the admissibility of
economic evidence have not yet arisen in New Zealand.21 This is because section 79 of the
Commerce Act provides that, except in relation to criminal and penalty proceedings, the
court may receive evidence that would otherwise not be admissible if, in its opinion, that
evidence may assist the court to deal effectively with the matter.22
Thus, in these various ways, the scene has been set in New Zealand for economics to
impact upon the interpretation of the Commerce Act.
III Rules of Law
Economics has the potential to influence and to shape the development of rules of law.
This can be seen to occur in an obvious way through the adoption of economic-styled tests.
It can also occur in more subtle ways where economic tests may assist in the formulation of
17 It is, however, too soon to refer to Privy Council trends. There has only been one appeal to date
which has required an assessment of competition issues. See Telecom Corporation of NZ Limited v
Clear Communications Limited [1995] 1 NZLR 385.
18 Tru Tone, above n 12, 357.
19 Telecom v Commerce Commission, above n 12.
20 Telecom v Commerce Commission, above n 12, 442 (per Richardson J).
21 In contrast, the rules of evidence have operated in Australia in a way which can obstruct the
introduction of economic evidence in the courts. See K Yeung "The Court-Room Economist in
Australian Antitrust Litigation: An Underutilised Resource?" (1992) 20 ABLR 461, 509-10.
22 Section 79 has generally been applied broadly by the courts. However, there is the possibility that
a narrower interpretation may be taken in which case s 79 may be invoked more readily for
peripheral rather than central matters. See A Bollard and D White "The Interface Between Law
and Economics in the Context of the Commerce Act 1986" in R J Ahdar (ed) Competition Law
and Policy in New Zealand, above n 7,50.
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a less or non-explicit economic formula.23 The impact that economics has had on the
formulation of rules of law under the Commerce Act can be demonstrated in two ways. It is
informative first to review the influence of economics on the central concepts of the Act, and
secondly, to consider how economics may provide analytical frameworks to assist in giving
meaning to legislation which lacks adequate specificity on particular matters.
A Concepts
The concepts which are central to the Commerce Act are these: "market", "competition",
"dominance" and "public benefit". A survey of these concepts reflects the complexities of
adapting economic theory to the formulation of legal rules. Sometimes economic theory can
assist in the interpretation of these vague and open-ended concepts with an appearance of
relative ease. Other times, the prevailing economic wisdom may seem inappropriate or may
merely provide guidelines which do not amount to solutions.
1 Market
The concept of "market" is pivotal to the Act4 and is the conventional first step to
competition law analysis.25 The significance of first ascertaining the relevant market is that
it will, if properly defined, include those goods and services which serve as competitive
constraints. These constraints can be of two kinds, namely those relating to demand and
those relating to supply. Demand substitution occurs if consumers can switch with relative
ease to the substitute products of other suppliers should a particular supplier attempt to
raise price and earn supranormal profits. Supply substitution, on the other hand, occurs if
an attempt by a supplier to earn supranormal profits would induce others to switch their
production to compete for these profits. Thus, there is an attraction to the exercise of market
definition as the first step in the analysis because of its focus on the identification of
competitive constraints.
However, the overall assessment of competition issues is more sophisticated than this,
and undue weight should not attach to the exercise of market definition. While such
preliminary inquiry may be informative, its main purpose is to provide the framework for
the assessment of other tests which are crucial to the analysis, such as market shares and
entry barriers. Clearly, the approach taken in defining the market will have a significant
effect on these other tests. For example, if a market is defined too widely or too narrowly
this will result in an inaccurate assessment of market shares. Similarly, the scope of the
defined market is relevant in assessing entry barriers. For example, if supply substitution is
more difficult or slower in the short run, the relevant market may be defined to exclude such
23 For further discussion of the effect of economics on the formulation of rules of law, see Pinos,
above n 13, 207.
24 See eg ss 27,36 and 47 of the Commerce Act 1986.
25 See Tru Tone, above n 12, 358 (per Richardson J).
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competitive constraints. However, if the market is delineated in such a narrow way, then it
may be appropriate to conclude that in the long run entry to it is likely to be easy.26
This background is significant because the current definition of the term "market" in
section 3(lA) is fashioned by economic principles such as those just described.27 "Market"
is defined as "a reference to a market in New Zealand for goods or services as well as other
goods or services that, as a matter of fact and commercial common sense, are substitutable".
So the question of substitution, which is essentially one of economics, is a matter of
considerable importance. This has been recognised by the High Court in Telecom u
Commerce Commission where it concluded that "the basic test [in defining markets] involves
the ascertainment of cross-elasticities of both supply and demand, that is to say, the extent
to which the supply of or demand for a product responds to a change in the price of another
product".28 The High Court also recognised that "market is a multi-dimensional concept -
with dimensions of product, space, functional level, and time".29 This additional framework
for defining markets also has an economic tone.
In practice, the identification of markets is a notoriously difficult exercise. The above
guidelines do not provide an easy solution to this task. Inevitably, there will be disputes
involving the definition of markets in the real world. Plaintiffs will seek to define them
narrowly, while defendants will endeavour to define them widely. However, the adoption
of economic principles at least provides some guidance and has contributed to the
sophistication of the Commerce Act analysis. For example, it is difficult to imagine that
dictionary definitions and perceived common sense would have resulted in the
identification of cross-elasticity principles and the recognition of functional levels of
markets. Further, the role of market definition in the assessment of competitive constraints,
and its interrelationship with other analytical tools, may well not have been fully
appreciated without some reference to the economics literature.30
26 For further discussion of market definition as an aid to analysis, see F M Fisher "Diagnosing
Monopoly" (1979) 19 Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 7, 12-17.
27 For a discussion of the background developments relating to this provision, see M N Berry "The
Application of Competition Laws to Business Acquisitions in New Zealand" in J H Farrar (ed)
Takeovers, Institutional Investors, and the Modernization of Corporate Laws (Oxford University Press,
Auckland, 1993) 293-95.
2 8 Above n 16, 102,362-63.
29 Telecom v Commerce Commissioe, above n 16, 102, 362-63.
30 For further recent discussion of market definition principles, incorporating references to other
leading writings, see R Pitofsky "New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on
Antitrust" (1990) 90 Colum L Rev 1805. For a challenge to the adequacy of current market
definition principles, see G J Stigler "The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly" (1982) 72 Am
Econ Rev 1, 8-9.
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2 Competition
Economic theory also has had a profound effect on the interpretation of the term
"competition", the central concern of the restrictive trade practices provisions contained in
Part II of the Act. While the term "competition" is defined in section 3(1) to mean "workable
or effective competition", such definition is inconclusive. It is against this background of a
vague and open-ended term that economic principles have assisted the decision-making
bodies in the development of an analytical framework. The most widely respected statement
on competition principles is the following passage of the Australian Trade Practices
Tribunal in Queensland Co-operative Milling Association:31
Competition is a process rather than a situation. Nevertheless, whether firms compete is very
much a matter of the structure of the markets in which they operate. The elements of market
structure which we could stress as needing to be scanned in any case are these:
(1) the number and size distribution of independent sellers, especially the degree of
market concentration;
(2) the height of barriers to entry, that is the ease with which new firms may enter and
secure a viable market;
(3) the extent to which the products of the industry are characterised by extreme
product differentiation and sales promotion;
(4) the character of 'vertical relationships' with customers and with suppliers and the
extent of vertical integration; and
(5) the nature of any formal, stable and fundamental arrangements between firms which
restrict their ability to function as independent entities.
Of all these elements of market structure, no doubt the most important is (2), the condition of
entry. For it is the ease with which firms may enter which establishes the possibilities of
market concentration over time; and the threat of the entry of a new firm or a new plant into
a market which operates as the ultimate regulator of competitive conduct.32
This again is the language of economics. It has been cited with approval in New
Zealand by both the High Court and the Court of Appeal.33
31 (1976) 8 ALR 481.
32 Aboven 31,516.
33 Auckland Regional Authority u Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Limited [19871 2 NZLR 647,670;
Fisher & Paykel, above n 9, 759; Tru Tone, above n 12, 363. In contrast, the Court of Appeal has
held that no particular bias or weighting in favour of conditions of entry should apply in the case
of dominance principles. Rather, the weighting to be attached to the factors set out in ss 3(8) and
3(9) will vary according to the facts. See Telecom v Commerce Commission, above n 12, 444 (per
Richardson J).
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One particular feature of this analytical framework is the reference to entry barriers.
This is an economic concept, in the way that it is incorporated into this test for competition,
and its particular relevance is obvious given the deregulatory trends of the New Zealand
economy. Entry barrier analysis is complex. The significance of the inquiry, in terms of
competitive constraints, can be readily explained. When new firms enter the market, or
when old firms re-enter or existing firms expand, this may place constraints on the
behaviour of the incumbent firm or firms. Thus barriers, which result in supranormal
profits not being eroded by entry, are a matter for particular scrutiny. But the enunciation
of an analytical framework for entry barriers is problematic. For example, how should the
concept be defined and what market characteristics or practices qualify as entry barriers?
Such inquiries involve significant economic controversy. There are two prevailing
views concerning the definition of entry barriers. First, the Bainian view is, in outline, that
a barrier to entry is some factor in a market that deters new entry and permits a firm
already in the market to earn monopoly profits.34 In contrast, the Stiglerian view is that
entry barriers are costs that a new entrant incurred which were not incurred by firms
already in the market.35 The preference of one of these views over the other is, of course,
likely to be highly influential in determining whether matters such as economies of scale and
restricted access to capital may constitute entry barriers. Other entry barrier
considerations, such as advertising, may receive similar treatment under both the Bainian
and Stiglerian formulations.36 The fact that there are such theoretical divisions does not,
however, mean that the concept cannot be applied in a meaningful way. Ultimately, it may
be appropriate to step back from the theoretical economics where there is no universal
view, and to make a practical assessment whether market characteristics or practices on the
facts under examination constitute entry barriers.
34 J S Bain Barriers to New Competition (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1956).
35 G J Stigler The Organization of Industry (Irwin, Homewood, 1968).
36 For further discussion o f the conflicting economic theories concerning the definition of entry
barriers and what constitutes an entry barrier, see H Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law
of Competition and its Practice (West Publishing Co, St Paul, 1994) 39-42, 466-79.
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Whether or not there are conflicting theories, the analysis of entry barriers has the
potential to be highly persuasive in the decision-making process.37 This consideration may
well have been identified in the normal course of events. Incumbent firms will speak freely
about their concerns of new entry. However, reference to the economics literature in this
field provides particular guidance because of its recognition of the significance and
complexity of this subject.
3 Dominance
Although economic theory has been highly influential in the way that the courts have
formulated the tests for both "market" and "competition", the same cannot be said of the
current state of the dominance test, which is the threshold test relating to monopolisation8
and business acquisitions.39
The legislative definition of dominance40 points to the need for economic analysis of this
concept. This definition equates the test of dominance with that of "dominant influence" and
requires that in determining if suppliers or acquirers are in a position to exercise a
dominant influence, regard shall be had to market share, technical knowledge, access to
materials or capital, and the competitive constraints of competitors, suppliers or acquirers.
This legislative framework was based upon European case law which reflected an
economic approach to the analysis of dominance principles. This was clearly recognised by
Parliament when it enacted the Commerce Act in 1986 and it was, until recently,
unanimously recognised by the various decision-making bodies in New Zealand.41
However, two trends have emerged in relation to dominance, namely the "economic"
approach and the "dictionary definition" approach. These trends reflect a tension between
law and economics and provide a case study which directly calls into question the utility of
an economic approach in defining concepts which relate to the functioning of markets.
37 The importance of entry barrier analysis is reflected, for example, in the most widely publicised
competition case of the first decade, namely Fisher & Paykel. This case involved a manufacturer
of whitegoods imposing on its retail dealers the requirement that they would not stock or sell the
whitegoods of any other supplier. The High Court judgment recites at some length the
arguments of the parties, but unfortunately does not provide a clear analytical framework for the
analysis of exclusive dealing arrangements. The judgment is further complicated by several
contradictory findings on the presence or otherwise of market power. Nonetheless, the court
appeared to attach considerable weight to low entry barriers in deciding that there had been no
breach of the Act. It was held that entry barriers relating to the market for the manufacture of
such goods were low as a result of tariff and import barriers being removed. It was also
emphasised that no significant retail space had been foreclosed. See above n 9,767.
3 8 Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986.
39 Section 47 of the Commerce Act 1986.
40 Sections 3(8) and 3(9) of the Commerce Act 1986.
41 See Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Limited (1995) 5 NZBLC para 99-352, 103,783-84.
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First, the "economic" approach. Early Commerce Commission decisions expressed the test
for dominance in terms of market power. For example, in Magnum Corporation
Limited/Dominion Breweries Limited42 the Commission said::43
Being in a 'dominant position' is interpreted by the Commission, in essence, as having
sufficient market power (economic strength) to enable the dominant party to behave to an
appreciable extent in a discretionary manner without suffering detrimental effects in the
relevant market(s).
This formulation of dominance principles was approved by the High Court and it also
rejected the notion that dictionary definitions should apply to ascertain the meaning of
"dominant".44 Rather, the High Court considered that "the word is used in the context of'a
dominant position in a market' so that in order to occupy such dominant position in a
market the concept of dominance must be looked at in the market context.',45
Dominance principles continued to develop in economic terms,46 much the same as those
for competition,47 until in comparatively recent times the Court of Appeal in Telecom u
Commerce Commission48 decided that a "dictionary definition" approach was preferable.
The Court stressed that dominance should not be given any technical economic meaning.
Rather, the relevant interpretative guidelines should be whether there existed a "prevailing,
commanding, ascendant, governing, primary, principal or leading influence".49 Cooke P
went further and concluded that:50
4 2 (1987) 1 NZBLC (Com) para 99-504.
43 Above n 42, 104,088. For a discussion of the parallel developments of the early Commerce
Commission decisions and the European Commission and European Court decisions under
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome (upon which ss 3(8) and (9) of the Commerce Act 1986 are
based), see R H Patterson "The Rise and Fall of a Dominant Position in New Zealand Competition
Law: From Economic Concept to Latin Derivation" (1993) 15 NZULR 265, 271-74.
44 Lion Corporation Limited v Commerce Ommission [1987] 2 NZLR 682, 690.
45 Above n 44.
46 See Berry, above n 27,297-306.
47 It has, however, been held that the dominance test sets a higher threshold than the competition
test. See Magnum/DB, above n 42, 104,088.
48 Above n 12.
49 Telecom v Commerce Commission, above n 12, 434 (per Cooke P). Similar dictionary definition
formulations were outlined or adopted by the other judges at 442 (per Richardson J), 447 (per
Casey J), 448 (per Hardie Boys J) and 449 (per McKay J).
50 Telecom v Commerce Commission, above n 12, 434.
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The extent to which a person is free from the practical constraints of competition is an
important consideration. Clearly there could be no more than one dominant influence over
each of the aspects of a market specified in the Act ... but it may be theoretically conceivable,
for instance, that one person could be in a position to exercise a dominant influence over
supply, while another was in a position to exercise a dominant influence over price.
This retraction of the economic principles relating to dominance was surprising. The
Court of Appeal had endorsed an economic approach in relation to the concept of
dominance just a matter of months before its Telecom judgment.51 The reasons for the
reversal are not clear. There are various statements which indicate that no technical
meaning should attach to the concept of dominance. For example, it is stated that "there is no
need in this case to add any gloss to the Act",52 that "the word 'dominant' is not used in any
technical sense',53 and is "one in ordinary use",54 and that "dominance is not a theory but a
market reality".55 However, beyond such statements, there is no real explanation for the
reversal.
This development reflects an acute tension between law and economics in the judicial
process. It also raises questions of significance relating to the future application of
economic principles to the concept of dominance, and perhaps also to the other central
elements of the Commerce Act with economic overtones. Is a non-technical approach
appropriate? What are the potential consequences of such an approach56
A major objection to the non-technical approach to interpreting the legislation is that it
is inconsistent with the objectives of the Act. As has been noted above, the legislature
intended that the Act should serve economic goals. This background suggests that there
should be economic input into decisions under the legislation. Further, as the High Court
has recognised, the language of sections 3(8) and (9) invites purposive analysis. These are
strong indications that the Court of Appeal's non-technical approach is not justified.
Another reason why a non-technical approach is undesirable relates to the guidance
that this may provide for future cases. Is it enough to ask if a company is "prevailing,
51 See Electricity Corporation Limited v Geotherm Energy Limited [1992] 2 NZLR 641, 648-49. On this
occasion the members of the court were Cooke P and Gault and McGechan JJ·
52 Above n 12, 434 (per Cooke P).
53 Above, 441 (per Richardson J) and 448 (per McKay J).
54 Above, 447 (per Casey J).
55 Above, 448 (per Hardie Boys J).
56 The point has similarly been made in Australia that economic issues and concepts contained in
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
economic objectives of the Act. See Yeung, above n 21, 464.
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commanding, ascendant" and so on? This approach, without more, does not appear to be
particularly informative. Further, without the assistance of economic principles, there is
the enhanced potential for uninformed and illogical statements to be made about the
workings of private commercial markets, as indeed happened in this case when it was
suggested that one person can exercise a dominance over supply while another may exert
such influence over price. An understanding of relevant economic principles may have
provided some guidance to assist in recognising that supply and price are not independent.
Rather, there is a direct relationship between the two. A firm can adjust price or quantity.
If it chooses to adjust price then the market will determine the quantity. It however, it elects
to adjust quantity then the market will determine the price for that good.57
The future direction of dominance principles remains uncertain. Interestingly, the High
Court in the latest round of the Port Nelson litigation8 has been required to consider, for
the first time, the impact of the Court of Appeal's dictionary definition approach.
Notwithstanding that the High Court accepted that the test for dominance was no longer a
matter of prevailing economic theory, it nonetheless endeavoured to explain the Court of
Appeal's approach at times in a distinctly economic way. For example, it was said that:59
"Dominance" includes a qualitative assessment of market power. It involves more than"high"
market power; more than mere ability to behave "largely" independently of competitors; and
more than power to effect "appreciable" changes in terms of trading. It involves a high
degree of market control.
As for market control:60
This is an economic context. The firm must be able to set terms of trading independently of
significant market constraints. It must be able to set prices or conditions without significant
constraint by competitor or consumer reaction.
Only time will tell whether this economic explanation of the Court of Appeal's judgment
in Telecom may point to a workable interpretation of the new approach to the dominance
test. Alternatively, it may suggest to the Court of Appeal that some technical redirection is
required. If this matter is not resolved, legislative intervention may be warranted, as the
High Court suggested in Port Nelson .61
57 See eg K Basu Lectures in Industrial Organisation Theory (Blackwell, Oxford, 1993) ch 11.
58 Above n 41.
59 Above n 41, 103,787.
60 Above n 41, 103,787.
61 Above n 41, 103,788.
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4 Public Benefit
The final concept, "public benefit", is economic to the extent that statute and case law
state that the term incorporates economic efficiency considerations.62 The public benefit
test is at issue when applicants seek authorisation for certain restrictive trade practices
and business acquisitions on the ground that there are public benefits which outweigh the
detriments arising from competition or dominance concerns.63 This balancing exercise
involves a tradeoff between market power and economic efficiency considerations.
To the extent that there is an economic framework to assist in this process it is the
Williamson tradeoff model. This model seeks to establish whether the cost savings achieved
through theoretically measurable economies can outweigh the deadweight loss resulting
from the reduction in output and corresponding increase in price.64 In essence, the
framework is the standard economic methodology of maximising economic efficiency.
However, the model was never intended to have practical application. Indeed, Williamson
himself referred to it as "naive',65 and much has been written about its lack of accuracy and
workability.66
Some consideration has, nonetheless, been given to the possible formulation of a net
efficiencies defence in the United States which would, if adopted, mirror the public benefit
test under the Commerce Act. Ironically, those who have been the strongest advocates of
allocative efficiency as the goal of antitrust have rejected the notion of an efficiencies
defence essentially because of measurement ambiguitites.67 This approach also has not been
62 See s 3A of the Commerce Act 1986; Telecom v Commerce Commission, above n 16, 102,383-86.
Economists divide the concept of efficiency into three components: productive, allocative, and
innovative efficiencies. For a discussion of these concepts, see J F Brodley "The Economic Goals of
Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress" (1987) 62 NYU L Rev 1020.
63 See ss 58, 61, 66 and 67 of the Commerce Act 1986.
64 O E Williamson "Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited" (1977) 125 U Pa L Rev 699, 707-13.
65 Above n 64, 710-13.
66 See eg Bork, above n 1,109-15; T J Muris "The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act" (1980) 30 Case W Res L Rev 381, 388-93; A A Fisher and R H Lande "Efficiency
Considerations in Merger Enforcement" (1983) 71 Calif L Rev 1580, 1624-51; A A Fisher et al
"Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers" (1989) 77 Calif L Rev 777,794-809; Hovenkamp, above n 36,
425-55.
67 Posner refers to efficiencies as "an intractable subject for litigation". See R A Posner Antitrust Law:
An Economic Perspective (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976) 112. Bork emphasises
that the measurement of efficiencies and deadweight loss is not theoretically possible because the
demand curve over all possible relevant ranges of output and the marginal cost curve over those
same ranges are not known. See Bork, above n 1, 125-26. Posner and Bork are, of course,
discussing the measurement of allocative efficiency. Innovative efficiencies claims are also likely
to be problematic in terms of proof. However, certain productive efficiencies claims may be more
readily proven. See P Areeda and D Turner Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and
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entertained by the courts or the enforcement agencies in the United States. However,
although the concept of a net efficiencies defence has been rejected, some support is emerging
in the United States for an absolute form of the defence. Under this approach it is suggested
that, in cases of clearly supportable productive efficiencies, there should be some relaxation
of the concentration ratios under which market power is presumed to exist.68 The debate is
unresolved.
Thus, the economics literature provides some guidance but no answers regarding the
concept of public benefit. It suggests that allocative and innovative efficiencies claims are
problematic because of measurement ambiguities. Although productive efficiencies claims
may be more readily proven, there is no economic framework which can be confidently
advanced to govern the balancing of claimed benefits against competition concerns. While
not providing answers, the economics literature nonetheless enables decision-makers to
better understand the nature of their task. They must trust their instincts and hope that
their predictions are correct, for the process is without analytical rigour.69
B Analytical Frameworks
The second way in which economics can influence the formulation of legal rules extends
beyond the definition of key concepts to the development of analytical frameworks in
circumstances where they are required to give meaning to legislation which lacks
appropriate specificity in some cases. An obvious example is the case of vertical mergers.70
Section 47 of the Commerce Act merely prohibits business acquisitions which result, or will
be likely to result in the acquisition or strengthening of a dominant position. No further
legislative guidance is provided relating to the particular circumstances of vertical
integration.
The experience in the United States provides an appropriate starting point to
demonstrate how economics can impact on the analysis of vertical mergers. Early treatment
of vertical mergers was extremely restrictive as evidenced in decisions such as Brown Shoe
their Application (Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1980) vol 4, 176-94. Another problem which may also
impact on the tradeoff is whether internal expansion or alternative forms of organisation may be
preferable. See Areeda and Turner, above, 161-71.
68 See eg R Pitofsky "Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy"
(19'92) 81 Geo LJ 195, 218.
69 For case studies involving the authorisation of business acquisitions on public benefit grounds, see
New Zealand Co-operative Dairy Company Limited/Auckland Co-operative Milk Producers Limited (1988)
1 NZBLC (Com) para 99-518; New Zealand Co-operative Dairy Company Limited v Commerce
Commission (1991) 3 NZBLC para 99-219.
70 Vertical mergers take two basic forms. They can involve forward integration, under which a firm
buys a customer, or they can involve backward integration, under which a firm buys a supplier.
For an outline of the categories of merger, see E Gellhorn and W E Kovacic Antitrust Law and
Economics (4 ed, West Publishing Co, St Paul, 1994) 353-59.
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Co v !1571 and Ford Motor Co v US.72 However, strong criticism of these and other cases on
economic grounds led to a reversal in these trends. It was strongly argued that vertical
mergers should be viewed as generally competitively neutral or procompetitive.73 Such
thinking centred upon the efficiency motivations for vertical integration. The most
important of these efficiency explanations was the reduction of transaction costs. Internal
transfers were considered to offer major competitive advantages. For example, the
internalisation of transactions could establish competitive alliances and give management
more effective ways of monitoring and improving performance. This approach provided the
foundation of the United States Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (1984)74 and the
highly permissive policy towards vertical integration during the Bush and Reagan
Administrations.75
These developments are of particular relevance to New Zealand because, in the search
for an appropriate analytical framework for vertical integration, there already has been
acceptance of the approach contained in these Guidelines. For example, the Commerce
Commission in Dunlop New Zealand Limited/Goodyear New Zealand Limited76 paraphrased
the three situations in which the Guidelines identified the potential for competitive concerns
as follows:77
(a) First, the degree of upstream or downstream vertical integration between two
functional markets must be so extensive as to cause entrants to the 'primary market'
(ie. the market in which the competitive impact is being considered) to enter
simultaneously the adjacent 'secondary market'. In short, this condition focuses on
the issue of 'two-level entry.'
(b) The second necessary condition requires that the need to enter at the secondary level
makes entry by others to the primary market significantly more difficult and hence less
71 370 US 294 (1962).
72 286 F Supp 407 (E D Mich 1968), affirmed 405 US 562 (1972).
73 See eg Bork, above n 1, ch 11.
74 4 Trade Reg Rep (CCH) para 13,103 (1984).
75 See eg M H Riordan and Steven C Salop "Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago
Approach" (1995) 63 Antitrust U 513, 514 .
76 (1987) 1 NZBLC (Com) para 99-513.
77 Above, 104,199. Similar principles had earlier been adopted by the High Court under the
Commerce Act 1975 in Fletcher Metals Limited v Commerce Commission (1986) 6 NZAR 33.
However, the most recent case has sounded a more cautionary note on the adoption of the
Guidelines. In Carter Holt Harvey Limited/Elders Resouces NZFP Limited (1990) 2 NZBLC (Com) para
99-527, 104,560 the Commerce Commission emphasised that, while the Guidelines are helpful as
a commencement point to the inquiry, they cannot replace the plain wording of the Act.
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likely to occur. In short, this second condition focuses on the increased difficulty by
others of simultaneous entry of both markets.
(c) Thirdly, the structure and other characteristics of the primary market must be
otherwise so conducive to 'non-competitive performance' that performance would be
likely to be affected by any raising of entry barriers. In other words, the third
necessary condition focuses upon the pre-existing structure and performance of the
primary market and recognises that the raising of entry barriers as a result of a vertical
merger could but need not, result in a loss of effective competition in the primary
market having regard to the pre-existing market circumstances.
The economic content of this statement is obvious. It follows, adopting this approach,
that there are only two ways that vertical integration can harm competition. The first is by
increasing barriers to entry such that (1) the merger must create foreclosure to the extent
that a rival must enter both markets to compete, (2) it must be significantly more difficult to
enter both markets than just one, and (3) the existing market must be concentrated. The
second major concern about vertical integration is that it may facilitate collusion in
circumstances where vertical integration is widespread and where market concentration is
significant.
Thus, economic theories relating to vertical integration have had, and will no doubt
continue to have, a significant influence on how provisions such as section 47 will apply to
vertical mergers. Of course, economic theories on complex matters like these will, over time,
be subject to internal advancement and changing attitudes. Indeed, the permissive policy in
the United States to vertical mergers has led to calls for the emergence of a policy which may
more readily identify the potential for anticompetitive effects. For example, Professors
Michael H Riordan and Steven C Salop have most recently attempted to identify limits to the
permissiveness of the previous policy. While accepting that many vertical mergers are likely
to be efficient and thus competitively neutral or procompetitive, they argue that there are
three situations in which vertical mergers can be anticompetitive: (1) vertical mergers can
lead to exclusionary effects by raising rivals' costs; (2) vertical mergers can facilitate tacit
or express coordinated conduct; and (3) vertical mergers can permit a firm to evade a variety
of pricing regulations.78 No doubt the debate will continue.79
78 Above n 75, 519-20, 527-64.
79 For further discussion on the future direction of vertical merger analysis, see D Reiffen and M
Vita "Comment: Is There New Thinking on Vertical Mergers?" (1995) 63 Antitrust U 917; M H
Riordan and S C Salop "Evaluating Vertical Mergers: Reply to Reiffen and Vita Comment" (1995)
63 Antitrust U 943.
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IV Economic Facts
That economists can assist in the formulation of rules of law is just part of the equation.
Rather, some commentators would view the general purpose of economic analysis as critical
"to explain behaviour and predict consequences".80 Professor Benjamin Klein, a leading
United States economist with experience of the New Zealand scene, was recently asked to
describe what economists can achieve in antitrust litigation. He concluded:81
The economist is an important, and perhaps a unique, element of any antitrust litigation. An
economics expert has the potential to understand what is going on and to tie together all the
other pieces of testimony to tell a complete, coherent story. This story may include a
discussion of pro-competitive or anti-competitive effects of a vertical restraint or of a
proposed merger. Discussion of these effects are crucial - not only because of any explicit
balancing that may be done between likely efficiencies and potential anti-competitive effects
but also, more importantly, to provide a rationale and motivation to defuse the credibility of
any alleged anti-competitive or pro-competitive stories. For example, instead of merely
demonstrating that anti-competitive effects are unlikely, it is instructive to have a story
which indicates why a particular acquisition is being undertaken or why a marketing practice
has been adopted.
Generally speaking, the courts have encouraged the use of economic experts.82
However, often faced with conflicting views of economists, the courts have emphasised that
evidence "in a controversial field [such as the evidence of economists] is to be treated with
the caution necessary in relation to all expert evidence",83 that there should be no "rubber
stamping" of the views of experts,84 and that "it would be naive to think that economics
furnishes a body of settled conclusions dispositive of any factual circumstances".85
However, the courts have also suggested that "in borderline cases the evidence and opinions
of economists may be of much assistance".86 It is, therefore, not surprising that there has
been a range of outcomes in relation to the review of expert economic evidence on the facts.
80 E Gellhorn "The Practical Uses of Economic Analysis: Hope vs Reality" (1987) 56 Antitrust U 933.
81 B Klein "The Use of Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Realistic Models of the Competitive
Process" in F Mathewson et al (eds) The Law and Economics of Competition Policy (The Fraser
Institute, Vancouver, 1990) 419, 434.
82 See eg Auckland Regional Authority, above n 33, 655; NZ Magic Millions Limited v Wrightson
Bloodstock Limited [1990] 1 NZLR 731, 750.
83 Union Shipping, above n 12, 701. Adopted in Fisher & Paykel, above n 9,756.
84 Telecom v Commerce Commission, above n 12, 434.
85 Above, 441.
86 Clear Communications Limited v Telecom Corporation of NZ Limited (1993) 4 NZBLC para 99-321,
103,342.
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In some cases, the courts have been receptive to the views of economists because "it is
inevitable that the parties and the Court must have recourse to expert economic advice"87 or
because ultimately the court was "left in the position of having to prefer one [economist]
over the other in respect of matters of conflict".88 In other cases, however, the courts have
been more emphatic that the application of economic principles to the facts of a case is a
matter for the court to decide.89
The potential for economic analysis to explain behaviour is well illustrated in the case
of predatory pricing by a monopolist. The conduct challenged is the charging of low prices.
The plaintiff will claim that such pricing strategy is calculated to eliminate it and to deter
others from entering and competing in the market. However, reduction in price is clearly
desirable from a consumer point of view and is the very kind of competitive behaviour
which competition laws ultimately seek to promote. In such cases the courts are clearly left
in a difficult position. What is really happening and who should be believed?
In such circumstances, economic analysis has the potential materially to assist the
judicial process. This is not to say that the economic explanations need be treated with
reverence. Ultimately, the courts will be required to decide any given predation matter in
terms of the prevailing legislation.90 However, the courts may be much better positioned to
reach the correct decision if they have the benefit of an economic explanation of what is
happening.
Recent case law developments in the United States demonstrate how influential
economics can be in the framing of tests for predation. In Brooke Group Limited v Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation,91 the Supreme Court accepted, in an area where there is
significant theoretical controversy,92 that there are two pre-requisites to predatory pricing
claims. First, it must be established that the prices complained of are below an appropriate
measure of the alleged predator's costs, and secondly, it must be established that the
predator had a reasonable prospect of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.93
87 Telecom v Clear, above n 17, 403.
88 NZ Magic Millions, above n 82,750.
89 Fletcher Challenge, above n 9,603. For further discussion of the difficulties in the use of expert
economic opinion in competition law cases, see Brunt, above n 8,303-05.
90 To date this approach has been emphasised in the only case concerning predation in New
Zealand. See Port Nelson, above n 41, 103,803-04.
91 125 L Ed 2d 168 (1993).
92 See eg G A Hay "Predatory Pricing" (1989) 58 Antitrust U 913.
9 3 Above n 91, 186-87.
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These pre-requisites were based upon the explanations provided by economists about how
predatory conduct should be analysed. These prerequisites are essentially economic tests.
The first test, whether the alleged predator's prices are at nonremunerative levels, has
attracted considerable attention over the last twenty years.94 It has the potential to be
complex and fact-intensive. Essentially, this test acts as a screening device. If the alleged
predator's prices are above its marginal cost, its behaviour is not inconsistent with short-
run profit maximisation. Therefore, predation is unlikely. However, if a monopolist is
pricing below marginal cost then it should be presumed to have engaged in predation. Of
course, marginal cost is inherently difficult to calculate. Thus, this first test has substituted
average variable cost for marginal cost. The result is that monopolists can price down to
average variable cost. However, if they venture below this level, then they do so at their
own peril in terms of competition law scrutiny.95
The preoccupation with the first test has meant that it has only been in comparatively
recent times that the second, and arguably more important test, has come into play. It has,
for example, been suggested that "the requirement that a monopolist must have good
prospects for recouping its losses from a seige of predatory pricing is implicit in the basic
economics of predation".96 This standard has now gained ascendency in the Supreme Court
opinions,97 and accordingly, claims of predation are likely to be rejected unless it appears
likely that the predator will be in a position to maintain monopoly power long enough to
recoup its losses and make additional gains. Factors which are likely to be determinative of
whether recoupment will be possible include the length of the predation, the extent to which
the prices are below cost and the entry conditions in the relevant market.98
New Zealand courts are unlikely to introduce a corresponding test for predation
because its tests will of necessity be shaped by the Commerce Act. However, in applying
this Act it is difficult to imagine that the courts will not attempt to understand and to
evaluate the conflicting claims of predation and competitive conduct. In this process the
94 This is the Areeda-Turner test. See P Areeda and D F Turner "Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act" (1975) 88 Harv L Rev 697.
95 Such test nonetheless has the potential to result in false positives and false negatives. See K G
Elzinga and D E Mills "Trumping the Areeda-Turner Test: The Recoupment Standard in Brooke
Group" (1994) 62 Antitrust U 559, 561-62.
96 Above, 573.
97 See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp 475 US 574, 588-90 (1986); Brooke Group,
above n 91, 187-99.
98 For further discussion of these and other indicators concerning recoupment, see Elzinga and
Mills, above n 95, 573-75. For a discussion of new theoretical developments concerning
multimarket recoupment, see J B Baker "Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic
Perspective" (1994) 62 Antitrust LJ 585,589-92.
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High Court will, of course, have the opportunity to consider the reliability of the witnesses
and to evaluate the evidence. In many cases, however, the answer may not be obvious. In
these circumstances, the explanation of economists, within controlled limits of fact-
intensiveness, may be of particular assistance.
V Conclusion
The impact of economics on competition law in New Zealand during the first decade of
the Commerce Act has been significant. Various trends have emerged. Some reflect unity
between the disciplines of law and economics, as in the case of market definition and
competition principles. In other areas, such as dominance principles, there are divisions.
The relationship between the disciplines can also be characterised in other more subtle
ways. For example, economics, although not providing solutions in some situations, may
nonetheless materially assist in helping decision-makers to understand the nature of the
theoretical problem before them or to understand what is happening in the marketplace.
As the first decade comes to a close, it is appropriate to reflect upon what these trends
may mean for the future. The interpretation of dominance principles is the one area where
there is significant tension between law and economics. This tension emerges solely as a
result of the Court of Appeal's judgment in the Telecom merger decision. This case
potentially creates some future uncertainty. At one level, the question remains whether the
Court of Appeal will revert to a technical economic interpretation of this concept. At
another level, these developments relating to dominance principles may raise wider
questions about the future direction of the Court of Appeal on competition law matters. If
this approach continues in relation to dominance, does it follow that the other central
concepts of the Act should be similarly construed in a non-technical way? The Court of
Appeal may well respond that it has in previous cases, like Tru Tone, used economic theory
in interpreting other concepts, such as market and competition, and that this trend will
continue. However, this response would be inconsistent and would call into question the
appropriateness of using one set of rules for dominance principles and yet another for the
other pivotal concepts of the Commerce Act.
Apart from the question of consistency, there are other reasons why non-technical
developments should not become a trend of the future. The history of the legislation reflects
the understanding that it requires an economic approach. The synergies of the disciplines
have also been recognised in a significant majority of the cases over the first decade.
Further, the most important decisions since the Court of Appeal's Telecom judgment have
continued to reflect the utility of economics in the field of competition law.99
99 As noted above, the only decision of the High Court on dominance principles since the Court of
Appeal's Telecom judgment reflects an attempt to assert the benefit of economic explanations of
the term. See the text above accompanying notes 58-61. The recent judgment of the Privy
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Notwithstanding that the relationship between law and economics stands at the
crossroads for the moment, at least in so far as dominance principles are concerned, it is
likely that economics will continue to have a major impact on the Commerce Act in the
decades to come. The foundations are strongly in place for the continued growth of law and
economics in this field. At times there will continue to be tensions. However, through
perseverance, there will be rewards.
Council in Telecom v Clear, above n 17, also reflects an acceptance of economic analysis relating to
the interpretation of s 36.
